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for Independence in Aden
When the Governor of Aden, William Luce, informed the Colonial Office that he was
proposing to ban strike action in the colony, they responded that his proposal would ‘amount
to an extreme departure from the labour policies consistently pursued by successive
Secretaries of State.’ 1 The year was 1960 and since the labour rebellions in the Caribbean
thirty years earlier, the Colonial Office had been cultivating properly constituted unions
bearing similar rights to their European counterparts as an antidote to full blown workers’
insurrection. This policy entailed, in conscious imitation of the historical development of
industrial relations in the old imperial metropolis, extending the right of free association to
workers and guaranteeing trade unions against tort action. For Luce, the proposal to deny
Adenese unions the right to strike was commensurate with the extremity of the circumstances
in Aden: as a dispute at the British Petroleum oil refinery in February had demonstrated,
normal industrial relations procedures had become ineffective at a time when the urban
workforce had taken up the politics of anticolonialism. On his account, the failure to curb the
local trade unions had contributed to an emergent political crisis and necessitated a new
Industrial Relations Ordinance (IRO). Yet the affairs of imperial Governors, like Luce, and
their overseers in the Colonial Office during the years of the Cold War and decolonisation,
have not generally been the concerns of labour historians. Such reticence is easily justified on
the basis that it has taken a great deal of scholarly effort to drag the attention of historians
away from their earlier preoccupation with the activities of political elites to the lives of
ordinary working people; but it is also problematic in the sense that the broader political
context is integral to an understanding of industrial conflicts during the years of imperial
decline. The political endeavours of the nascent trade unions of Africa, Asia and the
Americas were embedded in the wider processed of decolonisation and the Cold War. Peter
Weiler conducted pioneering work into the role of British labour in the Cold War twenty
years ago but his book paid almost no attention to the colonial aspect and there has been very
little significant work undertaken since.2
1 TNA: CO 1015/2605, Watts (CO) to Oates, 20 March 1960. CO 1015/2566, Governor (Aden) to Secretary of
State, 5 February 1960, 8 March 1960.
2 P. Weiler, British Labour and the Cold War (Stanford, 1988).
The last years of the British empire are a promising field of enquiry for those wishing to
examine the globalised history of labour. The events which accompanied the introduction of
the IRO in Aden indicate that three elements of the historiography on industrial relations and
decolonisation need a measure of reconsideration. Perhaps the most important of these is the
straightforward requirement to place the IRO back into the labour history of the British
empire from which it is presently excluded. While the origins of trade unionism in Africa and
the Caribbean have garnered comprehensive treatment, most conspicuously in the work of
Cooper and Bolland, the Middle East remains relatively neglected and Aden itself still more
so.3 To some degree this reflects the exceptional nature of Adenese labour history and the
unprecedented character of the IRO which, as the first section of this essay suggests, were
partly determined by the unusual material and political circumstances which prevailed in the
colony in 1960. These conditions generated a degree of perplexity in the corridors of British
officialdom and eventually produced some singular solutions. However, Adenese
circumstances were not entirely unique and policymakers looked both inwards at the
domestic history of British industrial relations and outwards to the operation of labour policy
across the empire in search of technical solutions to problems which arose in drafting the
legislation. In order to understand the motives behind the legislation it is also necessary to
register the obsession which British policy-makers had with the regional threat posed by
President Nasser of Egypt whose anti-colonial message was eagerly received by Adenese
workers.
In the second section the focus widens beyond the drafting of the IRO to consider the battery
of anti-labour measures employed by the colonial government. Currently the historiography
dealing with colonialism in Aden remains preoccupied with charges of appeasement levelled
at the British government by many of those who witnessed or participated in the last years of
colonialism in Aden. These indictments attend to three later moments of apparent weakness:
the decision to offer independence in 1964, the announcement in February 1966 that Britain
would abandon the base and the last minute decision to conduct negotiations with the
National Liberation Front (NLF) in October and November 1967.4 This kind of case becomes
3 N. Bolland, The Politics of Labour in the British Caribbean (Kingston, 2001, 362); F. Cooper, Decolonization
and African Society: The Labor Question in French and British Africa (Cambridge, 1996)
4 J. B. Kelly, Arabia, the Gulf and the West (London, 1980), 32; C. Mitchell, Having Been a Soldier (London,
1969), 5; M. Holt, P. Hinchcliffe & J. Ducker, Without Glory in Arabia: The British Retreat from Aden (London,
2006), 204-212; S. Harper, Last Sunset (London, 1978), 9-10.
rather less plausible once attention is refocused on earlier efforts to suppress anti-colonial
sentiment and nowhere was this more evident than in the punitive character of British
industrial relations strategy before 1964. This kind of reframing of the historiography is also
useful in revealing a significant degree of congruence with a newly emerging literature about
the coerciveness of decolonisation. Recent work by French, anatomising the corpus of
punitive techniques employed during post-war British counterinsurgency campaigns, and
Thomas, on the application of coercion in the industrial relations strategies of European
colonialists, provides the pertinent context for a re-examination of the anticolonial struggle in
Aden. There was, during the last years of empire, a very significant degree of overlap
between the tactics employed to deal with union activists and armed insurrectionists: many of
the techniques used to suppress insurgency, including the suppression of dissenting literature,
arbitrary deportations and imprisonment, accompanied the introduction of the IRO. French’s
emphasis on intimidation rather than counter-propaganda can be applied to labour struggle as
much as armed struggle, while Thomas’s suggestion that workers were in the vanguard of
conflict with the colonial authorities is thoroughly validated in the Adenese instance.5
If the history of late colonial counterinsurgency needs to incorporate labour history, then it is
still more strongly the case that the emergence of trade unions in Aden needs to be
reincorporated into histories of labour internationalism because, as the final part of this study
demonstrates, the IRO became something of a cause celebre in international labour circles
during the early 1960s. The labour internationals subjected events in the colonial periphery to
careful scrutiny in order to assess their impact on the Cold War balance of power.
Prohibitions on strike action and the exclusion of the majority of the working population from
the franchise were attacked by both the western-oriented International Confederation of Free
Trade Unions (ICFTU) and the eastern-oriented World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU).
As an ICFTU affiliate, the Aden Trade Union Congress (ATUC), under the leadership of
Abdullah al-Asnag, was able to exploit concerns within the ICFTU that the failure of the
imperial state to address political and industrial relations grievances would force colonial
unions into the embrace of the WFTU. Such a scenario alarmed the leadership of the ICFTU
but the possibility of such communist infringements on to their patrimony seemed
implausible to the British Colonial Office who accorded first priority to the containment of
5 D. French, The British Way In Counter-Insurgency (Oxford, 2011); M. Thomas, Violence and Colonial Order:
Police, Workers and Protest in the European Colonial Empires 1918-1940 (Cambridge, 2012).
Arab nationalist influences emanating from Nasser’s regime in Cairo. From their perspective,
if radical Nasserite nationalists in the labour movement could not be contained then they must
be suppressed. An important precedent for this kind of investigation of the interplay between
the East-West Cold War factors and North-South rivalries over the strategy of decolonisation
was set by Carew’s analysis of conflicts within the ICFTU. Unfortunately, the pursuit of
these themes since Carew published his work in the 1990s has not been particularly
vigorous.6 In an effort to extend Carew’s pioneering approach to the Middle East, the final
section of this essay will examine the success of ATUC in mobilising international labour
movements to oppose the introduction and implementation of the IRO; but first it is necessary
to consider the material circumstances which determined the evolution of trade unionism in
Aden.
The Industrial Relations Ordinance in a British and Colonial Context
Unusually for a European colony, manufacturing and services provided the principal
opportunities for work and investment in Aden. The port had a deep natural harbour and,
after the opening of the Suez Canal, was a convenient stopping point for journeys from South
and Southeast Asia to the Mediterranean and Europe. By the 1950s it was one of the busiest
ports in the world and the oil bunkering trade was particularly lucrative. Less remunerative to
the colonial authorities, but of increasing significance in regional politics, was the base at
Aden which during the 1950s and 1960s had to cater to ever larger numbers of British
airmen, soldiers and sailors. Having been chased out of first Palestine and then Suez, Aden
became the last redoubt of British regional power. Disagreements between the base
authorities and the cohort of cleaners, attendants and handymen who maintained the facilities
proved one of the most contentious areas of Adenese industrial relations.
Beyond the services provided at the port and base, workers in Aden were also employed in
one key form of manufacturing, namely oil refining. BP had relocated its processing
operations from Iran to Aden in the aftermath of the Mossadegh coup of 1951 and was
anxious to establish a reputation as a model employer. Despite these aspirations, it was a
6 A. Carew, ‘Conflict Within the ICFTU: Anti-Colonialism and Anti-Communism in the 1950s’, International
Review of Social History 41/2 (1996), 147-181
strike at the refinery in 1960 which precipitated Luce’s proposal for new and restrictive
industrial relations legislation. It was inevitable that the opportunities provided by docks,
base and refinery should lead to an influx of predominantly non-skilled labour. During the
1940s and 1950s many of these Yemeni labourers who came to work in the town congregated
under the ATUC banner. ATUC first emerged as a political force when industrial action
spread from the docks across much of the town between February and April 1956. Having
only recently arrived in the Colony, Luce recorded in September of that year:
‘Aden Colony is going through a period of rapid and violent transition. The face of
Aden must have changed astonishingly in these last few years and at the present rate
of new building port development and so on it will change as much again in the next
few years... the only thing that surprises me is that Aden was able to escape for so
long the sort of difficulties which have been part of life in most of these territories for
a number of years.’7
Two years later, on 26 April 1958, Luce’s apprehensions were realised when ATUC
organised a widely observed general strike. At this stage their grievances were more
economic than broadly political and included increased non-Arab immigration into the town,
the lack of social infrastructure and escalating price inflation. Luce and the Colonial Office
were unsympathetic and prepared instead for a new conflict with the Yemeni labour force.
One motivation for the introduction of the IRO was to correct this imbalance in the labour
market by pushing out the numerous Yemeni migrants. The Aden authorities estimated that
the Adenese workforce consisted of 28,000 Yemenis, 14,000 incomers from the surrounding
protected states and 22,000 Adenis. On top of this there were 6,000 registered and 10,000
unregistered unemployed. The over-supply of labour operated as a disincentive for the
colonial authorities to provide any measure of social provision for the new migrants. Any
outflux of Yemenis would, they estimated, drive up wages and increase productivity. They
concluded: ‘For economic as well as political reasons it would be in the Colony’s interest to
reduce the labour force at the expense of the migrant workers... If employers could achieve a
smaller settled labour force with a higher productivity they would be prepared to give higher
wages and fringe benefits.’8
7 The National Archives, Kew, [TNA]: CO 1015/1132, Luce to Secretary of State, 15 September 1956.
8 TNA: CO 1015/2605, Discussions held at the Colonial Office on 20 May 1960.
Worse still from the British perspective, the migrants provided an army of recruits for the
Arab nationalist cause which was being championed by Egypt’s President Nasser. As the
only formal British colony ever established in the Arab world, it was almost inevitable that
Aden should become a new front in the ongoing conflict between European imperialism and
Middle Eastern nationalism. After a century of management from India, the town was
transferred to direct British administration in 1937, at a time when European influence in the
region was still exerted informally through League of Nations mandates, treaties of protection
and advisory relationships. The governance of the Colony remained untrammelled by any
element of popular participation until the first elections were contested in 1955. Further polls
followed in 1959 and 1964 but ATUC leaders and their external supporters criticised the
narrowness of the franchise which excluded almost the entire Arab workforce. It would have
been impossible to pass a measure such as the IRO through the Legislative Council had its
members been elected by a wider constituency. More significantly still, no popular mandate
was requested for the most contentious measure undertaken during the last years of British
rule, namely the incorporation of Aden into a federation which was dominated by the ruling
families of the hinterland states who were regarded by the Colonial Office as reliable allies,
capable of restraining militant anti-colonialism in Aden. The hostility of the Sultans and
Sheikhs to democracy and trade unionism ensured that the merger controversy witnessed a
mingling of political and economic protest in Aden. Most ominously of all from Luce’s
perspective, the economic demands of workers for better pay and conditions and their
political demands for a greater say in the running of the Colony’s affairs and the exclusion of
Sultanic influence, were now expressed in a Nasserist lexicon which had been assimilated
through the broadcasts of Radio Cairo. In this way notions of Arab unity, social reform and,
overshadowing almost everything else, anticolonialism, entered local political debates. By
1962 ATUC had emerged as a champion of Arab nationalism in Aden and it was estimated
that its affiliates had a total of 17-18,000 members.9
The willingness of ATUC’s leaders to climb aboard the Arab nationalist bandwagon was
manifest in their decision to affiliate to the Confederation of Arab Trade Unions (CATU) in
1960. This was a move which had been long anticipated and long feared by the British
authorities on the grounds that CATU was the industrial arm of Nasserism and Nasser
9 Modern Records Centre, University of Warwick [MRC]: TUC records, MSS 292b/956.8/3, Additional Note on
the Political Situation in Aden, 18 October 1962.
remained for the British the principal impediment to the smooth workings of British policy in
the Middle East. The determination of the British government to retain control of Aden in
perpetuity had been made public by Lord Lloyd in 1956 and four years later few imagined
that Aden would become independent during the 1960s. British support for federalism was
primarily designed to ensure ongoing control of their base facilities in the Colony and to
combat Arab nationalism. When the possibility of introducing new industrial legislation was
first mooted William Gorell Barnes, the Permanent Under-Secretary at the Colonial Office,
reiterated that:
‘it is the policy of HMG to retain direct control of Aden Colony as long as possible so
that it can continue to use it as a base for the essential purpose of protecting our
interests in the Persian Gulf if the need arises...the position in Aden is rather different
from other colonial territories. The trade union leaders with whom we are dealing here
are in a sense Arab nationalists or at any rate riding on the horse of Arab
nationalism.’10
It was only in 1966 that the British government announced their intention to abandon the
base. Six years earlier it had been assumed that a combination of new legislation to contain
the influence of the local unions and the expansion of federal influence into Aden would be
sufficient to guarantee British strategic interests into the foreseeable future.
If the material demands of the present, most notably the threat posed by Nasserism to British
economic and strategic interests, pressed the British forward in pursuit of a more restrictive
industrial relations regime, then the past threw up endless obstacles to action in the form of
various precedents and non-precedents for the IRO, relating to the legality of withholding
labour, the prevention of political strikes and the principle of compulsory arbitration. The
first of these historic dilemmas was the non-precedent which had been established by the
absence in any other British colony of legislation banning the right to strike as part of a
dispute. One critic within the Colonial Office characterised Luce’s proposed legislation as
representing ‘a new and unusual degree of dirigisme in industrial relations’ and offered a
thermodynamic analogy for Aden’s politics which would prove prescient:
10 TNA: CO 1015/2606, Gorell Barnes minute, 10 June 1960.
‘Steam is at present let off through a series of strikes, cumulatively damaging and
provocative, but not yet in themselves decisive politically or economically. The more
these outlets are closed, the greater head of steam can be expected to build up and the
greater the prospects that it will break out, if at all, as a direct challenge to law and
order and to government.’11
It was also necessary to consider Britain’s international reputation and, although officials
were justifiably confident that the new legislation would not breach ILO conventions, they
also anticipated what was euphemistically described as ‘a lively reaction in international
labour circles’.12 Models for such legislation could be found but they came from outside the
formal empire, most notably Australia. To draw the sting from international criticisms,
Luce’s initial proposals were revised to enable unions who reached voluntary agreements
with employers to obtain exemption from the stipulations regarding compulsory arbitration.
The second issue over which the past loomed was a traditional bugbear of government, the
‘political strike’. The key precedent in this regard was not the refinery dispute which had
precipitated the legislation but ATUC’s successful general strike of February 1958. Fallowes,
who was appointed to advise Luce on the state of industrial relations in Aden, commented
that existing protection against tort actions, combined with the customary provisions allowing
freedom of association, had ‘placed in the hands of the trade unions of Aden a power of such
magnitude that the community can be held almost to ransom and at the same time be used as
an instrument to coerce and undermine Government.’13 His report prompted officials to
consider analogues drawn from the history of British trade unionism including the General
Strike of 1926 and the Trade Disputes and Trade Unions Act of 1927. The Aden authorities
favoured explicit measures to prohibit secondary action, using the 1927 British act as a
model. Restrictions of this kind were rejected by the Colonial Office because they were
certain to be denounced by the British TUC who regarded the 1927 act as a notoriously bad
piece of legislation and had directed a ‘barrage of criticism’ against it for the previous thirty
years. No attempt was made to prohibit secondary action or political strikes in the IRO on the
11 TNA: CO 1015/2605, Bennett, minute, 3 May 1960.
12 TNA: CO 1015/2605, Carstairs (CO) to Luce, 13 May 1960.
13 TNA: CO 1015/2605, Fallowes to Luce, 14 April 1960.
assumption that if trade unionists encouraged workers to strike on political matters they could
be prosecuted under penal laws dealing with sedition and incitement.14
The third perplexity arising from Luce’s proposals related to the principle of arbitration and
proved the trickiest of all to resolve. Under the planned legislation compulsory arbitration
was to be imposed in all sectors where trade unions and employers had failed to come to a
voluntary agreement. There was no expectation that ATUC would agree to voluntary
procedures and, in these circumstances, parties would be required to register any dispute with
the Labour Officer for mediation, from which point strike action would be prohibited. If
mediation failed the system of compulsory arbitration by an Industrial Court would be
imposed and the award of the court would constitute a final settlement. Drafting problems
arose because the Treasury and the Service departments of the metropolitan government
upheld the principle, which dated back to the aftermath of the General Strike, that the British
Crown would not tie itself to any system of compulsory arbitration; in their view, any breach
of these protocols would constitute judicial infringement on the prerogatives of Parliament
and undermine the disciplinary regime which was essential to the maintenance of order on
British military bases.15 The system of voluntary arbitration had been tested and maintained
by the Services under similar circumstances at other British bases, including Malta and
Singapore. Particular political difficulties arose in Aden because workers employed by the
civil administration and by the forces on the base would, under the new legislation, be
deprived of the right to strike, while the Crown as their employers would not be bound by the
award of the Court. After a great deal of head-scratching the situation was resolved by giving
the Crown the right to refuse arbitration in particular cases but restoring the workers’ right to
strike in any such instance.
Implementing the Ordinance: Industrial Relations Legislation and the Struggle for
Independence
There were three phases in the struggle for independence in South Arabia, each of which
witnessed a gradual escalation both in anti-colonial activity and the punitive measures
14 TNA: CO 1015/2605, Note on the Legality of a General Strike, 18 May 1960, Hirons to Bryce, 19 May 1960,
Secretary of State to Aden (Luce), 19 May 1960.
15 TNA: CO 1015/2606, Radice (Treasury) to Watt (CO), 24 June 1960.
undertaken by the British government to contain nationalist dissent. In the first, which
occurred during the 1950s, some of the elites of the Colony and the surrounding protected
states enlisted in the Arab nationalist cause. In Aden this new ideological orientation found
expression in the United National Front (UNF) and in the Protectorates it was represented by
the South Arabian League (SAL). The flight of the SAL leadership in 1958 and the
boycotting of the Adenese elections by the UNF in 1959 demonstrated the inability of local
elites to deflect the British from their chosen course of reforming rather than severing the
colonial relationship.16 In the second phase, which lasted from 1959 to 1963, the workers of
Aden found themselves at the vanguard of the independence movement under the umbrella of
ATUC. Increasingly frustrated by their political and economic marginalisation, both the
migrant and indigenous labour forces adopted the anti-imperialist messages promulgated by
Nasser in Cairo. The Industrial Relations Ordinance was a reaction to this increasing
politicisation and provided the pretext for a crackdown on dissent in the town. By 1963
labour relations had reached stalemate as the British refused to rescind its provisions and the
ATUC refused to cooperate with the local Ministry of Labour. The four years after 1963,
which marked the final phase, were dominated by escalating violence. Some of the most
significant fighting moved upcountry with the launch by the National Liberation Front (NLF)
of a revolutionary insurgency in the Radfan but the streets of Aden also became the setting
for urban warfare. There was some continuity across these different periods: former leaders
of the UNF and ATUC would later reappear in the 1960s as key figures in, first, the People’s
Socialist Party (PSP) and then the Front for the Liberation of South Yemen (FLOSY). The
latter became embroiled in a chaotic civil war with the Marxist revolutionaries of the NLF.
The 1967 revolution ended in victory for the NLF insurrectionists of the interior who pushed
aside the old trade union leadership in Aden, as well as the British.17 In many respects the
inability of the British to contain the post-1963 insurrection replicated the failure to curb the
growth in labour militancy in the earlier period and was grounded in the same tactics of
confrontation and punitive action.
16 S. Mawby, British Policy in Aden and the Protectorates: Last Outpost of a Middle East Empire (Abingdon,
2005), ch 3.
17 J. Kostiner, The Struggle for South Yemen (London, 1984); H. Lackner, ‘The Rise and Fall of the National
Liberation Front as a Political Organisation’ in B. R. Pridham (ed.) Contemporary Yemen (London, 1984), 46-63;
V. Naumkin, Red Wolves of Yemen (Cambridge, 2004).
From the outset the connection between the political and industrial struggle in Aden were
obvious to all parties: trade unionists made little attempt to camouflage their interest in
promoting Arab independence and, while the colonial authorities put more effort into
maintaining the distinction in public, they utilised the IRO as a weapon to suppress political
dissent in the Colony. Restrictive industrial relations legislation was designed to challenge
the ATUC’s ‘unprecedented control of the workforce’ which was interpreted by local
intelligence as a threat to British control of the town and the base. Reports described union
meetings as the principal forum for subversion; the breaking up of such gatherings signalled
the intention of the authorities to challenge ATUC’s accumulating influence over popular
opinion.18 Anybody who voiced support for strike action at such meetings was vulnerable to
legal action. By February 1963 there had been 229 prosecutions under the IRO and, although
many of those convicted had paid fines to avoid imprisonment, 11 union members were in
jail at that time.19 In some respects these legal processes were less significant than the pretext
the IRO provided for a crackdown on those identified by the local security forces as militants.
Suspected troublemakers were forcibly deported over the Yemen frontier and dissenting
literature was suppressed. An examination of the impact of the IRO on workers at the oil
refinery, where employers were notably lukewarm about the new legislation, the port, where
the legislation had consequences unimagined by its drafters, and at the base, where a state of
permanent conflict between the services and their employees developed, reveals a history of
tactical defeats for British goals which amounted to a wider strategic failure.
It was not just the expected refusal of ATUC to cooperate with the Industrial Court which
prevented the effective implementation of the IRO. Unanticipated problems arose, first, as a
consequence of BP’s reluctance to abet the colonial authorities because of the damage they
feared that any endorsement of restrictions would inflict on their attempts to portray the
company as a progressive employer and secondly, from the difficulties which non-ATUC
workers experienced in attempting to operate the new industrial relations machinery. When it
became evident, during the drafting of the IRO, that BP was unwilling to endorse restrictions
on the right to strike, the Colonial Office were horrified. BP was represented on the local
Legislative Council, by one of its employees, Sharpe, who had been nominated by the
18 India Office Records, British Library [IOR]: R/20/B/3036, Conway to Chairman Local Intelligence Committee,
16 August 1960.
19 TNA: CO 1055/223, Aden (Johnston) to Secretary of State, 11 February 1963.
governor. Sharpe told the Chief Secretary in August that ‘BP as a matter of policy took
scrupulous care to avoid giving public support to any form of restrictive legislation.’ Under
extremely strong pressure from the Aden authorities, which included discussion of the British
government’s role as majority shareholder in the company, Sharpe was eventually persuaded
to vote in favour of the legislation, rather than as BP had initially proposed, to absent himself
on the grounds of oil company business.20 After the introduction of the legislation another BP
employee, Cliff Tucker, was sent out to negotiate directly with the ATUC’s leadership. As
well as being an executive in BP, Tucker was a member of the Labour Party and served as a
councillor for the party in London. He liaised regularly with Marjorie Nicholson of the TUC
and it was difficult to tell which of them was more uneasy about the confrontational tactics
being pursued by the British government in the field of colonial industrial relations.21 During
his meetings with Al Asnag, Tucker ‘stressed the desire of the Company to finalise an
agreement and work together outside the new legislation... he wanted to work with the trade
union and ignore the new legislation.’22 The accommodationist stance of senior BP
negotiators could not insulate the base from ongoing industrial relations conflicts but it
strained the company’s relationship with the colonial government. When a new strike broke
out at the refinery in December 1961, BP entered further reservations concerning the decision
to prosecute union leaders and urged government officials to consider what could be done to
make the IRO ‘more palatable both in Aden and externally.’23
Perhaps even more damaging than the unwillingness of the leading employer to support the
legislation were the actions of some non-ATUC employees who inadvertently delivered a
damaging blow to the operations of the Ordinance. A handful of expatriate Indian workers
employed by the oldest and most prestigious merchant house at the port, Cowasji Dinshaw,
formed their own staff association which was unaffiliated to ATUC. When the company
proposed altering the terms by which it calculated severance pay, a dispute arose. Under the
terms of the IRO, the Industrial Court made an arbitration award which favoured the workers.
It was hoped by the colonial administration that this would encourage others to cooperate
with the new system but, instead, the company took the case to the local appellate court.
When their case failed there, Cowasji Dinshaw persisted in pursuing the matter with the
20 IOR: R/20/B/3035, Chief Secretary’s Minutes, 9 August 1960, 10 August 1960, 13 August 1960.
21 MRC: TUC Records, MSS.292b.956.8/1, Nicholson minute, 3 August 1960.
22 MRC: TUC Records, MSS.292b.956.8/1, Meeting with Cliff Tucker, 26 October 1960.
23 TNA: CO 1015/2641, Foggon minutes, 16 January 1961, 31 January 1961.
highest judicial authority available which was the East African Court of Appeal in Nairobi.
The court, whose territorial remit extended to Aden, decided in favour of Cowasji Dinshaw
and ordered the staff association to pay costs.24 This unwelcome East African intervention,
which effectively bankrupted the staff association, dismayed the colonial authorities who
began examining ways to detach Aden from the jurisdiction of Nairobi.25 In the interim,
employers at the port used the precedent established by this ruling to revoke an earlier deal
regarding end of service payments which had been made with the ATUC affiliate, the
General Port Workers’ Union. Unsurprisingly, this series of events was taken by critics of the
legislation as demonstrating its counter-productive character. In November 1961, George
Woodcock, the General Secretary of the TUC, complained to the new Colonial Secretary,
Reginald Maudling, ‘at least one major employer had found it possible to rely upon the mere
existence of the Ordinance to refuse, and to maintain his refusal to pay benefits to his staff,
even though the President of the Industrial Court subsequently held they should be paid.’26
From ATUC’s perspective the Cowasji Dinshaw case vindicated their refusal to cooperate
with the new industrial relations regime. Although for the first year of its operation, there
were few direct challenges to the new system, during 1961-62 workers at the base, who were
represented by the Forces and Local Employees Union (FLEU), emerged as the most
committed opponents of the IRO. As their employers, the British armed services had been
reluctant to submit to arbitration and this had caused problems during the drafting of the
legislation. They hesitantly agreed to accept the principle of compulsory arbitration, other
than on disciplinary matters, precisely in order to circumvent the provisions of the IRO which
would reinstate the union’s right to strike in cases where the employers were unwilling to be
bound by awards of the Industrial Court. For their part, as the most militant affiliate of
ATUC, the FLEU decided to challenge the new industrial relations regime from two
directions. The first was to internationalise the conflict by direct appeals to the International
Labour Organisation (ILO), the ICFTU and the Public Services International (PSI); the effect
of this strategy will be considered shortly. The second was to confront the colonial
government and employers by organising various forms of non-cooperation culminating with
a 72-hour strike in October 1962. A long period of tactical manoeuvring preceded this
24 TNA: CO 1015/2640, Civil Appeal #35 of 1961, Court of Appeal for East Africa, Judgement of J. A. Newbold.
25 TNA: CO 1015/2641, Aden (Johnston) to Secretary of State, 21 March 1962.
26 MRC: TUC records, MSS 292b/956.8/1, General Secretary to Maudling, 15 November 1961.
confrontation, during which union leaders established a series of emergency committees of
vigilance in an effort to evade the provisions of the IRO. In response, the Aden authorities
targeted ATUC and FLEU leaders for exemplary counter-measures. When intelligence
sources suggested that the union was planning a strike for 1 March 1962, five of its leaders
were imprisoned.27 The colonial government in Aden rejected pleas for leniency in their case
until they agreed not to encourage further strike action. The Acting Governor explained on 8
August 1962:
‘the opposition to the provisions of the industrial relations Ordinance by the ATUC is
primarily political and is deliberate. For as long however as it is necessary to retain
the ordinance in its present form everything possible must be done to ensure respect
for the law, and to enforce provisions of the Ordinance. This cannot be achieved
unless persons who deliberately commit offences under the Ordinance are
prosecuted.’28
Other leaders of trade unions who ignored the prohibition on strike action were also gaoled
including Abdullah Ali Murshid of the Technical Workers Union in October 1961 and Ali
Obeid of the BP Refinery Employees Union in December 1961. When a strike finally did
break out at the base, Luce’s replacement as High Commissioner, Charles Johnston, assured
the Colonial Office that he was taking ‘firm action’, including the prosecution of more than
40 workers.29
Aside from prosecuting and imprisoning union organisers and strikers, the colonial
government found other means to suppress political dissent emanating from the labour
movement, including the deportation of workers and restrictions on press freedom.
Deportations were primarily intended to instil fear among political opponents and became a
source of grievance for ATUC and their external supporters. The precedent was set by Luce
who authorised daily deportations of migrant workers as a means of containing industrial
unrest in November 1958.30 ATUC complained to the Colonial Office that Yemeni workers
27 TNA: CO 1015/2641, Governor’s Deputy (Aden) to Secretary of State, 3 March 1962.
28 TNA: CO 1015/2601, Acting Governor (Aden) to Secretary of State, 8 August 1962.
29 TNA: CO 1015/2643, Aden (Johnston) to Secretary of State, 6 November 1962, Gibbs minute, 6 November
1962.
30 IOR: R/20/B/3002, Simmonds to Luce, 15 November 1958, Luce minute, 15 November 1958, Simmonds
minute, 18 November 1958, Luce minute, 18 November 1958.
in the town ‘suffer ill treatment for the police, from time to time, get hold of a number of
building labourers and throw them over the borders.’31 As prosecutions under the IRO
became increasingly problematic from a political point of view, deportations offered a
punitive substitute. A strike by builders who were members of the Technical Workers Union
in October 1961 led to the deportation of 12 workers. By 1963, the new High Commissioner,
Kennedy Trevaskis, had become sceptical of the possibility of combatting industrial
militancy through the courts and instead relied on the security forces to round up workers
who were held to be engaged in political strikes. In response to rumours that nationalist
leaders would organise strikes to coincide with the visit of a UN investigatory team to the
Yemeni frontier in May 1963, Trevaskis declared that ‘a sudden deportation of 30 or so bad
hats... would have a sobering effect.’ The deportations were timed to ensure that the
deportees were stranded on the frontier with no possibility of getting back to Sana’ in time to
tell their stories to the UN delegation.32 When yet another dispute broke out at the base in
November 1963, Trevaskis complained to his diary, ‘with London so timorous, it w[oul]d be
difficult to get away with prosecuting. I have therefore resorted to deportation of Yemenis. I
signed 20 orders today.’ On 27 November he attempted to cover his tracks by telling the
police ‘we must deport non-strikers to lend substance to our claim that we are deporting on
security grounds & not because people are striking... They are going to pick up some of the
agitators who, tho’ not on strike have been inciting & intimidating.’33 In his correspondence
with the ICFTU General Secretary, Omar Becu, Al Asnag claimed that the British had
initiated ‘a wave of terror amongst innocent families.’ The expense entailed in offering legal
support to workers who had been arrested or deported eventually compelled the ICFTU to
seek additional assistance from the leader of its most well endowed affiliate, George Meany
of the American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations (AFL-CIO).34
The trade union movement in Aden was also on the frontline of the propaganda war with
British colonialism in the Middle East. Although the destruction, redaction and withholding
of records continues to present problems to historians attempting to establish the ambit of the
31 TNA: CO 1015/2013, ATUC to Secretary of State for Colonies, 14 February 1959.
32 Rhodes House Library [RHL]: Trevaskis Papers pt.2 (s.546), Box 2B, Diary, 23 May 1963, 24 May 1963, 25 May
1963.
33 RHL: Trevaskis Papers pt.2 (s.546), Box 2B, Diary, 22 November 1963, 27 November 1963, 28 November
1963.
34 International Institute of Social History, Amsterdam [IISH]: ICFTU 4955, Al Asnag to Becu, 28 November
1963, Braunthal to Meanym 24 December 1963, AFL-CIO telegram to ICFTU, 31 December 1963.
British propaganda campaign directed against nationalist groups in Aden, what is clear is that
for a period in the late 1950s and early 1960s one of their key aims was to discredit ATUC.
The colonial government was particularly perturbed that workers in Aden were drawing
moral support from nationalist propaganda broadcast by Radio Cairo. A document written by
David Treffry of the Aden administration’s Co-operative and Marketing Department offers
some insights into the tactics adopted by British officials. Treffry was instructed by Luce to
take control of information policy during the period when the IRO was introduced. He argued
that radio was the most important medium for the dissemination of anti-ATUC propaganda.
A number of personalities were invented by Treffry and his colleagues; these fictitious
characters made short broadcasts purporting to reflect the views of Arabs living in or visiting
Aden. For example, Mohammed al Naqabi was a fictional trade unionist who conducted
regular discussions about local affairs with his cousin, Ahmed. According to Treffry, when
broadcast, these avuncular colloquies provided ‘an excellent vehicle for digs at the union
leadership.’ The aim was to enhance the standing of loyalist Adenis by making them believe
that they had popular support and to foster disillusionment among rank and file members of
the ATUC.35 The Colonial Office also sought to suppress dissenting commentary on the IRO
by banning of ATUC’s daily newspaper, El Amel. The silencing of trade union journalism
was the one issue on which the ILO censured the Aden authorities. Although, at one point,
the local administration responded to these criticisms by authorising the publication of a
weekly trade union periodical, they were unwilling to countenance the return of El Amel in
its earlier format. From a local perspective efforts to stymie nationalist propaganda emanating
from the labour movement were an integral part of a wider strategy to counter anti-
imperialism among the working population.
Aden in a Global Context: International Labour, Decolonisation and the Cold War
The promulgation of the Industrial Relations Ordinance brought the politics of Aden to the
attention of the international labour movement. Ranging in feeling from irritation to anger
and listed in ascending order of animosity to the colonial regime, the key institutions which
became involved in the controversy were the British TUC, the ICFTU, the PSI, the WFTU
and the CATU. There was very little difference between protests lodged at the International
Labour Organization (ILO) by the nationalist-oriented unions of CATU and the communist-
35 IOR: R/20/B/3038, Treffry to Acting Chief Secretary, 13 August 1960.
oriented unions of the WFTU: both emphasised the political context provided by British
imperialism, and particularly the exclusion of most workers from the franchise and the
imposition of a federal system of government in Aden. Nevertheless, the involvement of the
WFTU, which represented unions sympathetic to the Soviet cause, and CATU, which was
committed to the Nasserist brand of anticolonial nationalism, demonstrated that industrial
conflict in Aden had both a Cold War and a colonial dimension. Western labour
organisations, including the TUC, the ICFTU and the PSI, also interpreted the conflict
through the prism of the Cold War but their concern was that the preoccupation of the British
government with containing Nasser’s independent brand of nationalism would provide the
WFTU with an opportunity to enhance its credibility in the Middle East.
When Alfred Braunthal, the Assistant General Secretary of the ICFTU met Luce on 20
August 1960 to urge him to postpone the enactment of the IRO he emphasised that ATUC
was ‘organised by men without much schooling, who... were generally trying to build up
something sound and permanent.’ He also warned that ‘the ICFTU would not accept the
necessity of such legislation except in time of war.’36 Braunthal’s intervention failed and after
the introduction of the IRO, the ICFTU entered into a competition with the WFTU regarding
who could make stronger representations about Aden case at the ILO. The WFTU was the
first into the field, issuing a complaint on 5 September and the ICFTU responded with its
own submissions on 30 September and 7 November. None of them got very far: the only
aspects of these complaints which were upheld related to the suppression of trade union
publications. Restrictions on the right to strike were judged not to breach the minimal
standards on freedom of association which the ILO was pledged to uphold.37 Rivalry between
the ICFTU and the WFTU for colonial affiliates strengthened the hand of ATUC. This was a
game that almost all trade unionists in the periphery of empire learned to play and al-Asnag
proved dextrous in his efforts to secure diplomatic and financial assistance. On 23 August
1961 he wrote to Becu complaining about the ICFTU’s inactivity and, in particular, its failure
to follow up on their initial complaints to the ILO:
‘The ATUC deplores Communism, that is why we are in the ICFTU. But we shall
never accept British oppression as a substitute of a so called threat of spread of
36 IOR: R/20/B/3035, Notes of a Meeting, 20 August 1960.
37 IOR: R/20/B/3037, ILO 57th report of the Committee on Freedom of Association, May-June 1961.
Communism to our country. To be honest with you, at some times my friends feel that
so far we have not tried Communism, it might be a good idea to advocate its cause
here as a substitute to the wild British rule.’38
Despite resentment at al-Asnag’s shameless gamesmanship and widespread and justified
scepticism about their likely efficacy, it was this logic which prompted the ICFTU to begin a
second round of protests to the ILO,
While for the labour movement in the West it was the intervention of the WFTU which was
of greater significance, for the British government al-Asnag’s embrace of Arab nationalism
and the CATU had greater salience and required decisive counter-measures including the
dismissal, imprisonment and deportation of ATUC activists. The punitive treatment of
workers involved in labour stoppages proved particularly irksome to critics of the Colonial
Office in the metropolitan and international labour movements because it offered the WFTU
an opportunity to expose the shallowness of western governments’ commitment to freedom
for workers to organise. The dismissal of 155 government employees because they had
participated either in the one-day general strike called in 1960 to protest about the
implementation of the IRO, or the subsequent token one-hour strikes, became a chronic
feature of the Colonial Office’s arguments with the representatives of international labour. At
the forefront of the remonstrations was the Belgian trade unionist and General Secretary of
the PSI, Paul Tofahrn. In January 1961 he suggested to Braunthal that ‘discrimination against
the Yemenite workers and their deportation from Aden appears to be particularly shocking
and vengeful.’39
Like the ICFTU, the PSI accentuated the Cold War implications of the colonial
administration’s assaults on ATUC. Tofahrn protested in May 1962 that the provisions of the
IRO were ‘incompatible with morality and justice as understood in the democratic world.’
More seriously still, Tofahrn became aware that the WFTU were offering assistance to those
arrested for participating in or encouraging local strike action. In such circumstances, he
feared, it would be the communist international which would appear as the ‘the sole defender
38 IISH: ICFTU 4592, Al Asnag to Becu, 23 August 1961.
39 IISH: ICFTU 1954g, Tofahrn to Braunthal, 19 January 1961.
of the victims of British colonialism.’40 When news reached the ICFTU that ATUC had
accepted WFTU funds in order to pay for legal assistance they issued a rebuke to al Asnag
but also offered to renew their funding and stepped up their assistance to imprisoned trade
unionists.41 This was successful in the sense that when al-Asnag was arrested later in the year
for his part in orchestrating strike action he turned to the western labour movement for
assistance. The British Labour Party and the Socialist International cooperated in arranging
his legal defence. David Ennals of the Labour Party’s International Department offered a
Cold War rationale for assisting al-Asnag which echoed that which was ringing around the
portals of ICFTU headquarters in Brussels: ‘there was the fear that they would turn to the
Communists if aid was not coming from democratic socialist circles.’ Al Asnag requested
that the former Labour Attorney General and future Home Secretary, Frank Soskice, should
act in his defence but Soskice recommended a less well known lawyer called Christopher
French who eventually secured the ATUC leader’s release.42
By this stage the ICFTU was developing a wider critique of British colonial practices in
Aden. In February 1962 Salah Galaoui of the Tunisian General Labour Union (UGTT) visited
Aden at the behest of the ICFTU to investigate the operation of the IRO. In his meetings with
Colonial Office officials their differences over what measures were required to fight the Cold
War and enable decolonisation became apparent. Galaoui told the Labour Commissioner:
‘that the ICFTU, which plays a great role in the fight against the expansion of
communism, could not understand why certain authorities in the free world persisted
in frustrating the action of trade union organisations which are animated by this same
idea. At the same time as the British authorities proclaimed their intention to leave
Aden to independence, they took steps to suppress a great organised popular force
which was equipped to contribute to the future of Aden.’
40 TNA: CO 1015/2601, Tofahrn to Secretary of State, 31 May 1962, Tofahrn to Foggon, 4 June 1962, Tofahrn to
Foggon, 3 July 1962.
41 IISH: ICFTU 4954e, Nedzynski to Tofahrn, June 1962, Tofahrn to Nedzynski, 15 June 1962, Nedzynski to Al
Asnag, 8 June 1962, Al Asnag to Becu, 12 July 1962, Becu to al Asnag, 16 August 1962.
42 Labour History Archive and Study Centre , Manchester [LHASC]: Labour Party Archive, International Sub-
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In reply, the Labour Commissioner criticised the willingness of the ICFTU to air its
grievances at the ILO rather than dealing bilaterally with elected representatives in Aden and
suggested that the organisation ‘did not seem to know there was a local government based on
elections.’43 On his return, Galaoui, told the Tunisian press that Adenese unions ‘met with all
kinds of persecution’, and noted that, when migrant workers were dismissed, there was a
practice of ‘taking them to the Yemen border and throwing them out.’44 At the seventh world
congress of the ICFTU in July 1962, ATUC secured endorsement for a resolution
condemning the perpetuation of British colonialism in Aden. In response to pressure from
ATUC, the ICFTU also renewed its complaints to the ILO about the manner in which the
Aden administration were conducting industrial relations. The ILO responded by reiterating
their view that the British authorities in Aden had met the minimum standards required to
enable freedom of association by workers.
While continental Europeans, such as Tofahrn, and Maghrebi Arabs, such as Galaoui, issued
unvarnished criticisms of colonialism, British trade unionists were more reticent. Prior to
1960 the British TUC had embraced the task of shepherding their Adeni equivalents to
respectability. The process had benefits for all parties: British colonial officialdom believed
the metropolitan trade unions would curb radicalism in the periphery, the TUC had an
opportunity to extend its influence and construct some institutional defences against
communist infiltration and the colonial unions hoped to gain financial and administrative
support and to mobilise their metropolitan allies to influence debates in Whitehall and
Westminster. In March 1957 Luce suggested that the intervention of the British TUC would
be welcome.45 Subsequently, James Young, Herbert Lewis and Andrew Dalgleish became the
key intermediaries between ATUC. The TUC was often critical of the ICFTU’s anti-
communist zealotry, which they believed was inspired by Cold War partisans in the AFL-
CIO. They were also more sceptical than the American unions about the probity and
efficiency of colonial unions and considered that the paternal role they adopted in relations
with the nascent unions of the imperial periphery was jeopardised when labour activists from
across the Atlantic trespassed onto British colonial territory. The strike at the refinery in
1960, which acted as a catalyst for the introduction of the IRO, was not supported by the
43 TNA: CO 1015/2601, Marsh (Brussels) to Formoy (CO) enclosing Galaoui report.
44 TNA: CO 1015/2641, Thomson (Tunis) to Wallis (Labour), 21 February 1962.
45 TNA: CO 1015/2013, Governor (Aden) to Secretary of State, 15 March 1957.
TUC who did their best to discourage the ICFTU from offering financial assistance from their
International Solidarity Fund. The General Secretary, Vincent Tewson, suggested: ‘I do not
think that we should use the Solidarity Fund to run strikes and particularly not this strike.’46
Such efforts to moderate local militancy and circumscribe the actions of international labour
were appreciated by British governmental officials. Considerably less gratifying to the
Colonial Office was the TUC’s reaction to the implementation of the IRO. British unions
adopted a meliorist line which balanced their loyalties to ATUC and the international trade
union movement against its sense of obligation to the Colonial Office. This strategy failed to
satisfy either party. Before the introduction of the legislation the TUC urged the Colonial
Secretary, Iain Macleod, to suspend its provisions. The Colonial Office told the Governor:
‘Tewson we feel has no illusions about character of ATUC but does have some doubts about
whether action you are taking is going to improve situation.’47 Partly in order to appease
Tewson, the Colonial Office offered to suspend the enactment of the IRO, but this manoeuvre
was founded on the warranted assumption that al-Asnag’s ‘hot-headed colleagues’ would not
allow him to reach a compromise deal.
Once it became clear that the British administration in Aden intended to use the legislation to
suppress political dissent, the metropolitan labour movement became increasingly uneasy.
Marjorie Nicholson of the International Department of the TUC and the Labour MP, Bob
Edwards, who had close links to the TUC, were the most prominent British critics of the IRO.
One Colonial Office functionary described Nicholson as ‘an ardent apologist for the ATUC
cause.’48 Her primary concern was that the IRO had generated deadlock on the industrial
relations front in Aden which would ensure that discontent spilled over into political activity:
‘there is a danger of illegal strikes getting out of control of the ATUC and the further danger
of ATUC ceasing to try to control them.’49 In August 1961 she arranged a meeting between
ATUC and ICFTU representatives to discuss the most effective means of lobbying the
Colonial Office. Pressure from the TUC and the ICFTU appears to have played a role in the
licensing of a weekly ATUC newspaper and the reinstatement of some of those who had lost
their jobs as a consequence of the 1960 strikes. The implications of the Cowasji Dinshaw
46 IISH: ICFTU 4954c, Tewson to Millard, 16 March 1960.
47 IOR: R/20/B/3035, Secretary of State to Governor (ud).
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case and the strike by the Technical Workers Union on 19 October 1961 generated new
tensions. Grievances about the arbitrary dismissal of 16 building workers and the even more
punitive decision to deport another 12 led George Woodcock to complain directly to
Maudling.50 In March 1962 Robert Willis, who played the role of TUC troubleshooter on
many colonial issues, expressed concern about ‘the severe almost vicious application of the
provisions of the IRO.’ He also alluded once again to the Cold War implications: ‘If the
position was not improved political activities would increase and outside influences would
exploit the situation.’51
Further fuel was added to the fire when Bob Edwards visited Aden in June 1962, in the
company of another Labour MP, George Thomson. Whereas Woodcock and Willis had
disregarded the political issue of Aden’s incorporation into a federation of Sultanates and
Sheikhdoms, Edwards insisted that the planned merger had alienated local workers. He
described a situation of ‘grave industrial unrest’ in Aden and broadly accepted ATUC’s
characterisation of the IRO as ‘an insult to their trade union integrity.’ Rather than the
irresponsible firebrands of Colonial Office memoranda, the ATUC leaders were characterised
in Edwards’s report as ‘moderate intelligent young men’. He recommended that Labour
should demand the withdrawal of the Ordinance and press for the inclusion of ATUC
representatives in constitutional talks. In October 1962 members of the TUC General Council
met the latest Conservative Colonial Secretary, Duncan Sandys, to demand that any merger
of Aden with the federation should be preceded by elections in the Colony. Sandys’s
justifications were, on their account, thoroughly unsatisfactory.52 As late as 1964, the Labour
MP, Dick Taverne, advised the Party’s International Department that ATUC was ‘the most
mature and responsible trade union movement in the Arab world.’ On the other hand,
Taverne was also concerned about the use of strike action as ‘a political weapon’ and such
reservations led to a final distancing of relations between Adenese unions and their
international and metropolitan sponsors.53 Any hopes of reforming the IRO were submerged
beneath the rising tide of urban insurgency. In September 1963 a Joint Advisory Council
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(JAC), on which ATUC was represented, was established. Two years later the JAC published
plans for major revisions to the legislation which would still have curtailed the right to strike
but which removed some of the objectionable elements associated with operation of the
Industrial Court. Legislative action was suspended amidst the collapsing security situation
and in August 1965, ATUC withdrew from the JAC and the Industrial Relations Ordinance
remained in unenforced existence until the final British withdrawal in November 1967.
Conclusion
The presence of an oil refinery, a military base, a busy port and the only British governor in
the Arab world made Aden a singular example of mid-20th century British imperialism and
the exceptional character of the Industrial Relations Ordinance may partly be explained by
these circumstances. The activities of the British Governor provided unmistakable evidence
of the lack of local political autonomy, while the demand for labour to staff Aden’s service
and manufacturing economy established the basis for a trade union movement with the
potential to exercise significant political power. Frederick Cooper in his work on Africa has
demonstrated that labour played a decisive role in resisting the imposition of western systems
of control into the last years of European imperialism and to some degree the Adenese case
replicates his findings.54 Yet in explaining why Aden became the location for the introduction
of the most restrictive piece of trade union legislation enacted during the last years of the
British empire, metropolitan and international circumstances must also be accounted for.
With regard to the former, the disabling features of the IRO suggest that the liberalisation of
industrial relations regimes envisaged by Government House and Whitehall had a provisional
character. When set alongside the other measures undertaken to contain ATUC’s influence it
seems feasible to extend David French’s work concerning the punitive character of British
counterinsurgency strategy to the field of labour politics.55 Long before the British had lost
faith in the possibility of suppressing strikes through the application of legal penalties, they
had been supplementing the legal restrictions with two other devices drawn from the
repertoire of counterinsurgency, namely deportations and restrictions on free expression. It
was this punitive aspect of British colonial administration which engrossed the international
labour movement. Western trade unions seemed more alive to the Cold War implications of
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the legislation than the British government. The Colonial Office were preoccupied with the
threat which ATUC posed to orderly politics and, although they were insistent that many of
their problems were attributable to external manipulation, they believed the principal
troublemakers were inspired by Cairo rather than Moscow. ATUC responded by drawing on
the dense institutional web of the international labour movement and it is this aspect of the
affair which makes it such an interesting case of the globalisation of labour conflict. As they
pursued an agenda which sought greater equity in the treatment of workers and political
independence, trade unions were subject to many restrictions, but one resource which they
could exploit was their global connections. In the case of ATUC they drew at different times
on support from the Arab unions of CATU, the western-oriented unions of the ICFTU and the
eastern-oriented unions of the WFTU. By this means a local conflict over trade union
legislation became embroiled in much wider debates about the role of labour in the Cold War
and decolonisation.
